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Abstract
Distributed machine learning is an approach allowing differ-
ent parties to learn a model over all data sets without dis-
closing their own data. In this paper, we propose a weighted
distributed differential privacy (WD-DP) empirical risk min-
imization (ERM) method to train a model in distributed
setting, considering different weights of different clients.
We guarantee differential privacy by gradient perturbation,
adding Gaussian noise, and advance the state-of-the-art on
gradient perturbation method in distributed setting. By de-
tailed theoretical analysis, we show that in distributed setting,
the noise bound and the excess empirical risk bound can be
improved by considering different weights held by multiple
parties. Moreover, considering that the constraint of convex
loss function in ERM is not easy to achieve in some situa-
tions, we generalize our method to non-convex loss functions
which satisfy Polyak-Lojasiewicz condition. Experiments on
real data sets show that our method is more reliable and we
improve the performance of distributed differential privacy
ERM, especially in the case that data scale on different clients
is uneven.
Introduction
In recent years, machine learning has been widely used in
many fields such as data mining and pattern recognition
(He et al. 2015; Xu, Ni, and Yang 2018; Wang et al. 2018;
Zhang et al. 2019). Because of the need of data for training
machine learning algorithms, tremendous data is collected
by individuals and companies. As a result, sensitive infor-
mation disclosure is becoming a huge problem. In addition
to data itself, model parameters trained by data can reveal
sensitive information in an undirect way as well.
To solve the problems mentioned above, differential pri-
vacy (Dwork 2011) is proposed to preserve privacy in ma-
chine learning and has been applied to principal compo-
nent analysis (PCA) (Chaudhuri, Sarwate, and Sinha 2013;
Ge et al. 2018; Wang and Xu 2019b), regression (Chaudhuri
and Monteleoni 2009; Zhang et al. 2012; Jayaraman et al.
2018), boosting (Dwork, Rothblum, and Vadhan 2010; Zhao
et al. 2018), deep learning (Shokri and Shmatikov 2015;
Abadi et al. 2016; Farquhar and Gal 2019) and other fields.
There are mainly three methods to achieve differential pri-
vacy: output perturbation (Dwork et al. 2006; Pathak, Rane,
and Raj 2010; Bassily, Smith, and Thakurta 2014; Zhang et
al. 2017), objective perturbation (Chaudhuri and Monteleoni
2009; Chaudhuri, Monteleoni, and Sarwate 2011) and gradi-
ent perturbation (Bassily, Smith, and Thakurta 2014; Abadi
et al. 2016; Geyer, Klein, and Nabi 2017). Among them, gra-
dient perturbation is the most popular method because it can
be applied to any gradient descent method, which makes it
general, and it not only protects the results but also the gra-
dients, which makes it more reliable.
With the development of organizations’ corporation, mul-
tiple parties’ desire to train models by combining data is
becoming stronger, such as biomedicine and financial fraud
detection. In these situations, different parties want to use
all the data without disclosing their own data, which brings
more press on privacy preserving. Moreover, the number
of data instances owned by different parties always varies
greatly, making the performance degrade significantly.
Distributed machine learning is an approach to solve
multiple-party learning problem. Among many distributed
learning strategies, divide and conquer is simple and effec-
tive. It preserves privacy by minimizing information com-
munications, which has caused widespread concern of re-
searchers. Pathak, Rane, and Raj (2010) proposed the first
distributed differential privacy machine learning method,
whose privacy is preserved by output perturbation. Ja-
yaraman et al. (2018) introduced differential privacy dis-
tributed methods using output perturbation and gradient per-
turbation, achieving better performance. McMahan et al.
(2016) proposed federated learning method to address dis-
tributed machine learning problem, without privacy preserv-
ing. Based on (McMahan et al. 2016), Geyer, Klein, and
Nabi (2017) proposed a method to guarantee that whether
a client participants in federated learning cannot be inferred,
preserving privacy on federated learning to some extent.
McMahan et al. (2017) proposed a user-level differential pri-
vacy method on training LSTM, applied on language mod-
els. However, among the work mentioned above, only feder-
ated learning based methods consider about weights of par-
ties when aggregating parameters. Considering that in real
scenarios, data scale on different clients is always uneven,
simply averaging without weights leads worse performance.
Moreover, most work assumes that loss function is convex in
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Table 1: Comparison between our method and other methods on noise bound and excess empirical risk bound
Gaussian Noise Bound Excess Empirical Risk Bound Distributed Non-convex
Pathak, Rane, and Raj (2010) None O
(
(m−1)2(λ+1)
n2
(1)
λ2
+ p
2(λ+1)
n2
(1)
2λ2
log2(pδ ) +
p(m−1)(λ+1)
n2
(1)
λ2
log(pδ )
)
Yes No
Jayaraman et al. (2018) O
(
G2T log(1/δ)
m2n2
(1)
2
)
O
(
pG2L log2(mn(1)) log(1/δ)
m2n2
(1)
λ22
)
Yes No
Zhang et al. (2017) O
(
pG2 log(n/δ) log(1/δ)+G22
2
)
O
(
G
√
p log(n/δ) log(1/δ)D
n
)
No Yes
Wang, Ye, and Xu (2017) O
(
G2T ln(1/δ)
n22
)
O
(
pG2 log2(n) ln(1/δ)
n22
)
No Yes
Our Method WD-DP O
(
G2T ln(1/δ)
n22
)
O
(
pG2log(n) ln(1/δ)
n22
)
Yes Yes
theoretical analysis, but not considers about the non-convex
condition.
To address the problems above, in this paper, we propose
Weighted Distributed Differential Privacy (WD-DP) ERM
method based on divide and conquer distributed method,
applying gradient perturbation by adding Gaussian noise to
guarantee (, δ)-differential privacy. We consider about dif-
ferent weights owned by different parties instead of sim-
ply averaging when aggregating models’ parameters to re-
duce the negative impact caused by uneven data scale, which
leads a better noise bound and excess empirical risk bound
theoretically. Experiments on real data sets show that the
performance of our method is much better than the method
proposed in (Jayaraman et al. 2018), the best method in dis-
tributed differential privacy ERM we know. Moreover, con-
sidering the fact that most previous theoretical analysis on
differential privacy ERM is based on convex functions and
this constraint is not easy to guarantee in some situations,
first, we improve the proof process of the excess empirical
risk bound proposed by Wang, Ye, and Xu (2017) in central-
ized setting and then generalize our method to non-convex
functions which satisfy the Polyak-Lojasiewicz condition in
distributed setting.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We introduce
some related work on distributed differential privacy ERM
methods and centralized differential privacy ERM under
non-convex condition in Section 2. We propose our method
WD-DP in detail and then analyze the (, δ)-differential pri-
vacy of our method in Section 3. We give the theoretical
analysis of the excess empirical risk bound of our method
on both convex and non-convex conditions in Section 4. We
present the experimental results in Section 5. Finally, we
conclude the paper in Section 6.
Related Work
In this section, we first introduce some related work over dis-
tributed differential privacy machine learning. Then, we in-
troduce some work on centralized differential privacy ERM
under non-convex condition.
Distributed Setting
Pathak, Rane, and Raj (2010) proposed a distributed privacy
preserving protocol whose objective function has a regular-
ization term λN(θ), where θ is the model with p parame-
ters. Different parties train models locally and interact with
curator to construct additive shares of a perturbed aggre-
gated model. This work guarantees differential privacy by
output perturbation, adding Laplace noise. In this work, pa-
rameters’ delivery relies on homomorphic encryption (Pail-
lier 1999), which is expensive on computation.
Jayaraman et al. (2018) introduced a distributed learning
method, combining privacy with secure multi-party compu-
tation (SMC) (Tian et al. 2016). This work guarantees dif-
ferential privacy by output perturbation and gradient pertur-
bation, adding noise within a SMC. The noise bound and ex-
cess empirical risk bound are better than in (Pathak, Rane,
and Raj 2010) by assuming the loss function `(·) is G-
Lipschitz and L-smooth. Particularly, in this method, parties
aggregate parameters by simply averaging. As a result, if the
number of data instances on parties is not even, the perfor-
mance will decrease rapidly. Unfortunately, in real scenar-
ios, data scale on clients is always uneven.
McMahan et al. (2016) proposed a decentralized method
to solve the problem of distributed machine learning, Feder-
ated Learning, and applied it on deep networks. This method
leaves training data distributed on different parties and learns
a shared model by aggregating local models. This work con-
siders about different weights of different parties when ag-
gregating models, but does not consider much about privacy
preserving, without theoretical analysis on privacy or utility.
In the method WD-DP, proposed by this paper, by consid-
ering about different weights held by different parties when
aggregating parameters, we achieve better performance both
theoretically and practically, no matter data scale is even or
not. So, our method is more general and adapt to most sce-
narios. The comparison between our method and other meth-
ods mentioned above on noise bound and excess empirical
risk bound is given in Table 1.
It can be observed in Table 1 that without considering
about regularization term, noise bound and excess empiri-
cal risk bound of our method are better than the best dis-
tributed method we have known, proposed by Jayaraman et
al. (2018), by a factor of (mn(1))
2
n2 and
(mn(1))
2 log(n)
(log(mn(1))n)2
, respec-
tively, where m is the number of parties, n(1) denotes the
smallest size of data set owned by parties and n represents
the total number of data instances over all data sets. Partic-
ularly, our method is much better than the method proposed
by Jayaraman et al. (2018) when data scale is uneven on
clients and remains the same performance under even data
scale. In other words, the method mentioned above is a spe-
cial case of our method WD-DP under average setting. And
obviously, the excess empirical risk bound of our method is
much tighter than which in (Pathak, Rane, and Raj 2010). It
is worth emphasizing that although our method is proposed
under distributed setting, it achieves almost the same theo-
retical performance as centralized methods.
Non-convex ERM
Zhang et al. (2017) proposed Random Round Private SGD,
guaranteeing (, δ)-differential privacy over non-convex
function. It is the first theoretical result on centralized non-
convex differentially private ERM problem. In this method,
the excess empirical risk bound is proportional to D, the up-
per bound of the `2 norm of the model’s parameters.
Wang, Ye, and Xu (2017) gave theoretical analyses on
noise bound and excess empirical risk bound of gradient per-
turbation under non-convex condition in centralized setting,
assuming the iteration number is T . However, the proof pro-
cess on the excess empirical risk bound of this method can
be better, leading a tighter excess empirical risk bound.
Wang and Xu (2019a) studied the centralized differential
privacy ERM problem with non-convex loss functions and
gave upper bounds for the utility. This work considers the
problem in both low and high dimensional space and shows
that for some special non-convex loss functions, the utility
can be improved to a level similar to convex ones.
In this paper, first, we improve the proof process on ex-
cess empirical risk bound in (Wang, Ye, and Xu 2017).
Then, considering there is no previous theoretical analysis
over distributed non-convex differential private ERM, we
extend this method to distributed setting in which loss func-
tion is not constrained convex. The comparison between our
method and these centralized methods under non-convex
condition on noise bound and excess empirical risk bound
is given in Table 1.
It can be observed in Table 1 that by improving the proof
process proposed by Wang, Ye, and Xu (2017), our excess
empirical risk bound is tighter than before by a factor of
log(n). Meanwhile, considering the parameter D is hard to
control, our method is more reliable than which proposed by
Zhang et al. (2017), with a tighter noise bound.
WD-DP: Weighted Distributed Differential
Privacy Empirical Risk Minimization
In this section, we first introduce some basic definitions
and the Empirical Risk Minimization in distributed setting.
Then, we propose our method WD-DP in detail and give
theoretical analysis of (, δ)-DP over our algorithm.
Given d-dimensional vector x=[x1, x2, ..., xd]>, denote
its `2-norm as ‖x‖=(
∑d
i=1 |xi|2)
1
2 . O˜(·) is similar to O(·),
but hiding factors polynomial in log n and log(1/δ). Denote
the probability distribution of data as Dn, for two databases
D,D′ ∈ Dn differing by one single element, they are de-
noted as D ∼ D′, called adjacent databases.
Definition 1. (Dwork et al. 2006) A randomized function
A : Dn → Rp is (, δ)-differential privacy ((, δ)-DP) if
P [A(D) ∈ S] ≤ eP[A(D′) ∈ S] + δ,
where S ∈ range(A) and p is the number of parameters.
According to the definition, differential privacy requires
that data sets D,D′ lead to similar distributions on the out-
put of a randomized algorithm A. This implies that an ad-
versary will draw essentially the same conclusions about an
individual whether or not that individuals data was used even
if many records are known a priori to the adversary.
The centralized ERM objective function is defined as:
LD(θ) =
1
n
n∑
i=1
`(θ, xi, yi),
where (xi, yi) denotes data instance, ` is the loss function.
Distributed Differential Privacy
Suppose there arem parties P1, P2, ..., Pm, owning data sets
D1, D2, ..., Dm with size n1, n2, ..., nm respectively. Parties
train their own model θ(1), θ(2), ..., θ(m) locally to prevent
data disclosing (in this paper, we denote model by parame-
ters), and then their models are aggregated by a trusted third
party (called server).
So, in distributed setting, considering all the parties, the
objective function is:
LD(θ) =
1
m
m∑
j=1
1
nj
nj∑
i=1
`(θ, x
(j)
i , y
(j)
i ), (1)
where party j’s data instances are denoted as (x(j)i , y
(j)
i ).
By equation (1), when it comes to gradient perturbation,
considering about round t, with learning rate η, we have the
updating criteria on party j:
θ
(j)
t+1 = θ
(j)
t − η(∇LDj (θ(j)t ) + zt),
and the updating criteria on server after T local iterations is:
θ(c) =
1
m
m∑
j=1
θ
(j)
T , (2)
where LDj (θ) represents the objective function over party j,
zt ∼ N (0, σ2Ip) is Gaussian noise guaranteeing differential
privacy and θ(c) denotes the aggregated model on server.
Weighted Distributed Differential Privacy
Traditional methods use equation (2) to aggregate parame-
ters by simply averaging. However, this method pays more
attention on data instances in small data sets, which leads
worse noise bound and excess empirical risk bound. Con-
sidering that data scale on clients in real scenarios is always
uneven, simply averaging leads worse performance.
So, to solve the problem mentioned above, instead of sim-
ply averaging the parameters when aggregating models, we
consider the weights of different parties related to their data
sets’ size, which leads updating criteria on the server to:
θ(c) =
m∑
j=1
nj
n
θ
(j)
T .
When considering about weights of different parties, data
instances in different parties are paid same attention, which
reduces the negative impact caused by a single bad data in-
stance, rare but special high noise generated for guarantee-
ing differential privacy or uneven data scale.
Our method is detailed in Algorithm 1. Note that in Algo-
rithm 1, we assume that the size of data sets nj are public
knowledge, like in (McMahan et al. 2016).
Algorithm 1 Weighted Distributed Differential Privacy
ERM Method: WD-DP
Require: m parties indexed by j, number of local iteration
rounds T , learning rate η
1: function DISTRIBUTEDLEARNING(m,T, η)
2: First, m parties download random θ(c) from the
server as initialization.
3: Party j (j ∈ {1, 2, ...,m}) executes at round t:
4: θ(j)t+1 = θ
(j)
t − η(∇LDj (θ(j)t ) + zt),
5: where zt ∼ N (0, σ2Ip).
6: Server executes after T local rounds:
7: θ(c) =
∑m
j=1
nj
n θ
(j)
T ,
8: where n =
∑m
i=1 ni is the total number of data.
9: return θ(c).
10: end function
Differential Privacy. In this paper, we guarantee (, δ)-DP
using Gaussian Mechanism proposed by Dwork et al. (2006)
and moments accountant introduced by Abadi et al. (2016).
Theorem 1. In Algorithm 1, for , δ ≥ 0, if `(θ, x, y) is
G-Lipschitz over θ and
σ2 = c
G2T ln(1/δ)
n22
, (3)
it is (, δ)-DP for some constant c.
Proof. Consider the tth query which may disclose privacy:
Mt =
m∑
j=1
nj
n
[
1
nj
nj∑
i=1
∇`(θ(c)t , x(j)i , y(j)i ) +N (0, σ2Ip)
]
=
1
n
n∑
i=1
∇`(θ(c)t , xi, yi) +N (0, σ2Ip),
(4)
where θ(c)t represents θ
(c) after t local rounds.
In moments accountant method proposed by Abadi et al.
(2016), the λth (λ ≥ 1) moment αM (λ;D,D′) on mecha-
nism M is defined as:
αM (λ;D,D
′) = logEo∼M(D) [exp(λc(o;M,D,D′))] ,
(5)
where c(o;M,D,D′) is privacy loss at output o, defined as:
c(o;M,D,D′) = log
P [M(D) = o]
P [M(D′) = o]
. (6)
In order to preserve privacy, it is necessary to bound all
possible αM (λ;D,D′). So, αM (λ) is defined as:
αM (λ) = max
D,D′
αM (λ;D,D
′).
Denote probability distributions on adjacent databases D
and D′ over mechanism Mt as P and Q:
P = ∇LD(θ(c)t ) +N (0, σ2Ip) = N (∇LD(θ(c)t ), σ2Ip),
Q = ∇LD′(θ(c)t ) +N (0, σ2Ip) = N (∇LD′(θ(c)t ), σ2Ip).
By Definition 2.1 in (Bun and Steinke 2016), define Dα
as:
Dα(P‖Q) = 1
α− 1 log
(
Ex∼P
[(
P (x)
Q(x)
)α−1])
. (7)
By equations (5), (6), (7) and definitions P , Q, we have
equations below over mechanism Mt:
αMt(λ) = logEo∼P
[
exp
(
λ log(
P
Q
)
)]
= logEo∼P
[(
P
Q
)λ]
= λDλ+1(P‖Q).
By Lemma 2.5 in (Bun and Steinke 2016), we have:
λDλ+1(P‖Q) =
λ(λ+ 1)
∥∥∥∇LD(θ(c)t )−∇LD′(θ(c)t )∥∥∥2
2σ2
.
Note that ` isG-Lipschitz (denoted asG below), and there
is only one single element different between D and D′, sup-
pose it is the nth one, we have:
∇LD(θ(c)t )−∇LD′(θ(c)t )
=
1
n
(
n−1∑
i=1
∇`(θ(c)t , xi, yi) +∇`(θ(c)t , xn, yn)
)
− 1
n
(
n−1∑
i=1
∇`(θ(c)t , xi, yi) +∇`(θ(c)t , x′n, y′n)
)
=
1
n
(
∇`(θ(c)t , xn, yn)−∇`(θ(c)t , x′n, y′n)
)
(G)
≤ 2G
n
.
Thus,
αMt(λ) = λDλ+1(P‖Q) ≤
2G2λ(λ+ 1)
σ2n2
.
By Theorem 2.1 in (Abadi et al. 2016), we have:
αM (λ) ≤
T∑
t=1
αMt(λ).
Then, note that λ ≥ 1, we have:
αM (λ) ≤
T∑
t=1
αMt(λ) = 2λ(λ+ 1)
G2T
σ2n2
≤ 4λ2 G
2T
σ2n2
.
Taking σ2 = cG
2T ln(1/δ)
n22 for some constant c, we can
guarantee that:
αM (λ) ≤ 4λ2 G
2T
σ2n2
≤ λ
2
,
and as a result, we have:
4λ2G2T2
cG2T ln(1/δ)
≤ λ
2
,
which means:
δ ≤ exp(−λ
2
),
means (, δ)-DP due to Theorem 2.2 in (Abadi et al. 2016).
In Theorem 1, ` is G-Lipschitz, but not constrained con-
vex. Thus, Theorem 1 is general in both convex and non-
convex conditions.
Although Algorithm 1 considers distributed setting, equa-
tion (4) is not related to the number of partiesm. As a result,
Gaussian noise guaranteeing (, δ)-DP is not related to mul-
tiple parties, but has the same form as in centralized setting.
Moreover, we consider moments accountant method and
different weights held by parties when aggregating models,
so the bound is tighter than which introduced by Jayaraman
et al. (2018) by a factor of (mn(1))
2
n2 , where n(1) is the small-
est size of data sets owned by all the parties. When data scale
on clients is not even, our method is much better.
Theoretical Analysis over Convex and
Non-convex Conditions
In this section, first we give the analysis of excess empiri-
cal risk of our method WD-DP under convex condition and
then generalize it to non-convex functions which satisfy the
Polyak-Lojasiewicz condition. To our knowledge, this is the
first theoretical analysis of excess empirical risk bound on
non-convex distributed differential privacy ERM.
Convex
In this part, we give the theoretical analysis of excess empir-
ical risk when objective function L(·) is λ-strongly convex.
Theorem 2. Suppose that `(θ, x, y) is G-Lipschitz and L-
smooth over θ, LD(θ) is λ-strongly convex and differen-
tiable, with σ is the same as in (3) and learning rate η = 1L .
We have:
E [LD(θT )]− L∗D ≤ O
(
pG2 ln(1/δ) log(n)
n22
)
,
where T = O˜
(
log( n
22
pG2 ln(1/δ) )
)
, L∗D = minθ∈Rp LD(θ)
and p is the number of parameters.
Proof. According to updating criteria of gradient descent:
θt+1 − θt = −η(∇LD(θt) + zt) = − 1
L
(∇LD(θt) + zt).
Function ` is L-smooth (denoted as L below) and LD(θ)
is differentiable (denoted as d below), we have:
Ezt [LD(θt+1)− LD(θt)]
(L,d)
≤ Ezt
[
〈∇LD(θt), θt+1 − θt〉+ L
2
‖θt+1 − θt‖2
]
≤ − 1
L
‖∇LD(θt)‖2 − 1
L
〈∇LD(θt), zt〉
+
1
2L
‖∇LD(θt)‖2 + 1
2L
Ezt ‖zt‖2 +
1
L
〈∇LD(θt), zt〉
= − 1
2L
‖∇LD(θt)‖2 + 1
2L
Ezt ‖zt‖2 .
(8)
LD(θ) is λ-strongly convex and differentiable, from
(Csiba and Richta´rik 2017), we have:
‖∇LD(θt)‖2 ≥ 2λ(LD(θt)− L∗D). (9)
For random variable X , we have:
E(X2) = E2(X) + v(X), (10)
where v(X) denotes variance of X .
So, by (9) and (10), inequality (8) can be transferred to:
Ezt [LD(θt+1)− LD(θt)]
≤ −λ
L
(LD(θt)− L∗D) +
1
2L
(
E2zt ‖zt‖+ v(‖zt‖)
)
= −λ
L
(LD(θt)− L∗D) +
pσ2
2L
.
Then, summing over T iterations, we have:
E [LD(θT )]− L∗D
≤ (1− λ
L
)T (LD(θ0)− L∗D)
+
pσ2
2L
(
(1− λ
L
)0 + (1− λ
L
)1 + ...+ (1− λ
L
)T−1
)
= (1− λ
L
)T (LD(θ0)− L∗D) +
pσ2
2L
L
λ
(
1− (1− λ
L
)T
)
≤ (1− λ
L
)T (LD(θ0)− L∗D) +
pσ2
2λ
.
(11)
Taking T = O˜
(
log( n
22
pG2 ln(1/δ) )
)
, we have:
E [LD(θT )]− L∗D ≤ O
(
pG2 ln(1/δ) log(n)
n22
)
.
Remark 1. In (Wang, Ye, and Xu 2017), inequality (11) is
simply scaling to:
E [LD(θT )]− L∗D ≤ (1−
λ
L
)T (LD(θ0)− L∗D) +
Tpσ2
2L
.
(12)
Obviously, equation (11) is tighter than equation (12). In this
way, we improve the proof process, leading a better excess
empirical risk bound by a factor of log(n).
(a) KDDCup99 (b) Adult (c) Bank
(d) Breast Cancer (e) Credit Card Fraud
Figure 1: Accuracy on data sets over privacy budget . m = 32, data instances owned by each client is not the same.
It can be observed that our method is better than which
in distributed setting (Jayaraman et al. 2018) and cen-
tralized setting (Wang, Ye, and Xu 2017) by a factor of
(mn(1))
2 log(n)
(log(mn(1))n)2
and log(n), respectively. Intuitively, giving
weights to parties means data instances owned by all parties
are of the same importance, similar to centralized setting.
Conversely, simply averaging gives more weight to data in-
stances in smaller data sets, making it more distributed.
Non-convex
In this part, we generalize the analysis above to non-convex
L(·) which satisfies the Polyak-Lojasiewicz condition.
Definition 2. For function L, denotes L∗ = minθ∈Rp L(θ),
if there exists µ > 0 and for every θ,
‖∇L(θ)‖2 ≥ 2µ(L(θ)− L∗), (13)
then function L satisfies the Polyak-Lojasiewicz condition.
Obviously, convex functions also satisfy equation (13).
In fact, Polyak-Lojasiewicz condition is much more general
than convex. Karimi, Nutini, and Schmidt (2016) showed
that when function F is differentiable and L-smooth under
`2 norm, we have:
Strong Convex ⇒ Essential Strong Convexity ⇒ Weak
Strongly Convexity ⇒ Restricted Secant Inequality ⇒
Polyak-Lojasiewicz Inequality⇔ Error Bound
Theorem 3. Suppose that `(θ, x, y) is G-Lipschitz and L-
smooth over θ, LD(θ) satisfies the Polyak-Lojasiewicz con-
dition and differentiable, σ is the same as (3) and η = 1L .
We have:
E [LD(θT )]− L∗D ≤ O
(
pG2 ln(1/δ) log(n)
n22
)
,
where T = O˜
(
log( n
22
pG2 ln(1/δ) )
)
, L∗D = minθ∈Rp LD(θ)
and p is the number of parameters.
The proof of Theorem 3 is shown in Appendix A.1.
It can be observed that our excess empirical risk bound
over both convex function and non-convex function which
satisfies the Polyak-Lojasiewicz condition are tighter than
which over convex function in (Jayaraman et al. 2018) by a
factor of (mn(1))
2 log(n)
(log(mn(1))n)2
, where m is the number of parties
and n(1) denotes the smallest data set’s size. Under the situ-
ation of uneven data scale in real scenarios, the gap between
mn(1) and n is huge, our method is extremely superior.
Moreover, by Remark 1, we proof that the excess empir-
ical risk bound can be tighter than which in (Wang, Ye, and
Xu 2017) by a factor of log(n).
Experiments
Experiments are performed on classification task. We com-
pare our method to the gradient perturbation method pro-
posed by Jayaraman et al. (2018) and the centralized pri-
vacy method proposed by Wang, Ye, and Xu (2017). The
(a) KDDCup99 (b) Adult (c) Bank
(d) Breast Cancer (e) Credit Card Fraud
Figure 2: Accuracy on data sets over the level of non-average u. m = 16,  = 0.05, clients are divided into 2 groups, the
number of data instances owned by each client in the same group is the same.
comparison between our method and others is represented
by accuracy and optimal gap. Optimal gap is defined as
L(θ) − L(θ∗), where θ∗ is centralized optimal non-privacy
model. Accuracy represents the performance on test data and
optimal gap denotes excess empirical risk on training data.
We use logistic regression method on the data set KDD-
Cup99 (Hettich and Bay 1999), Adult (Dua and Graff 2017),
Bank (Moro, Cortez, and Rita 2014), Breast Cancer (Man-
gasarian and Wolberg 1990) and Credit Card Fraud (Bon-
tempi and Worldline 2018), the number of total data in-
stances are 70000, 45222, 41188, 699 and 984, respectively.
In all the experiments, G = 1, the Lipschitz constant of the
loss function (the proof is shown in Appendix A.2). Total
local iteration rounds T is set 1000 and learning rate η is
chosen by cross-validation from 0.01, 0.05, 0.1, 0.5 and 1.
First, we evaluate the influence over differential privacy
budget ,  is set from 0.01 to 0.25 and δ = 0.001. In this
setting, we set the number of clients m = 2, 4, 8, 16, 32 and
the number of data instances owned by each client is set ran-
domly. Moreover, considering about the real scenario, we
set a threshold of the smallest data set’s size, ensuring ef-
fective models are trained by clients. Then, we evaluate the
influence caused by the difference on data sets’ size owned
by different clients. We define the level of non-average u
as nmaxnmin , where nmax and nmin denote the maximum and
minimum data set’s size, respectively. In the experiments,
considering the number of total data instances, u is set from
1 to 9 on data set KDDCup99, Adult and Bank, while from 1
to 5 on the rest data sets. Particularly, u = 1 means average
setting. For the sake of simplicity, we divide all the clients
into 2 groups, clients in the same group have the same data
sets’s size.
Figure 1 shows the accuracy over privacy budget . It can
be observed that by considering different weights of differ-
ent clients, our method WD-DP is better than the method
proposed in (Jayaraman et al. 2018) and is similar to the
centralized method proposed in (Wang, Ye, and Xu 2017).
Performance is becoming better when  increases, which is
the same as intuition. Corresponding optimal gap and more
experiment results over  with different number of clients m
are shown in Appendix B, leading similar results.
Figure 2 shows the accuracy over the level of non-average
u. It can be observed that in average setting, when u = 1,
the accuracy of our proposed method WD-DP is similar to
the method proposed in (Jayaraman et al. 2018). However,
when u increases, which means data scale is more and more
uneven, the accuracy of our method is steady, but the accu-
racy of which proposed by Jayaraman et al. (2018) decreases
rapidly or fluctuates sharply. Thus, our method is more reli-
able, especially in the case of uneven data scale, which is the
same as in theoretical analysis. Corresponding optimal gap
and more experiment results over uwith different number of
clients m and privacy budget  are also shown in Appendix
B, which lead similar results.
Conclusion and Discussion
We propose a distributed differential privacy ERM method
WD-DP, providing (, δ)-differential privacy by gradient
perturbation, adding Gaussian noise. Our work shows that
by considering about different weights of different clients,
noise bound and excess empirical risk bound can be im-
proved in distributed setting. Moreover, considering most
previous work on differential privacy ERM assumes loss
functions are convex and this constraint is not easy to
achieve in some situations, we generalize our method to non-
convex conditions. Theoretical analysis and experiment re-
sults on real data sets show that we improve the best previous
noise bound and excess empirical risk bound for distributed
differential privacy ERM, especially under the condition that
data scale on clients is uneven, which is common in real sce-
narios. In future work, we will focus on non-convex opti-
mization under distributed differential privacy ERM setting
(e.g. deep learning), and reducing time complexity of the
model, considering most models are synchronous.
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A. More Details and Proofs
A.1 Proof of Theorem 3
Proof. The proof is similar to Theorem 2.
According to updating criteria of gradient descent:
θt+1 − θt = −η(∇LD(θt) + zt) = − 1
L
(∇LD(θt) + zt).
Function ` is L-smooth (denoted as L below) and LD(θ) is differentiable (denoted as d below), we have:
Ezt [LD(θt+1)− LD(θt)]
(L,d)
≤ Ezt
[
〈∇LD(θt), θt+1 − θt〉+ L
2
‖θt+1 − θt‖2
]
≤ − 1
L
‖∇LD(θt)‖2 − 1
L
〈∇LD(θt), zt〉+ 1
2L
‖∇LD(θt)‖2 + 1
2L
Ezt ‖zt‖2 +
1
L
〈∇LD(θt), zt〉
= − 1
2L
‖∇LD(θt)‖2 + 1
2L
Ezt ‖zt‖2 .
(14)
Note that LD(θ) satisfies the Polyak-Lojasiewicz condition, then we have:
‖∇LD(θt)‖2 ≥ 2µ(LD(θt)− L∗D). (15)
For random variable X , we have:
E(X2) = E2(X) + v(X), (16)
where v(X) denotes variance of X .
So, by (15) and (16), inequality (14) can be transferred to:
Ezt [LD(θt+1)− LD(θt)]
≤ −µ
L
(LD(θt)− L∗D) +
1
2L
(
E2zt ‖zt‖+ v(‖zt‖)
)
= −µ
L
(LD(θt)− L∗D) +
pσ2
2L
.
Then, summing over T iterations, we have:
E [LD(θT )]− L∗D
≤ (1− µ
L
)T (LD(θ0)− L∗D) +
pσ2
2L
(
(1− µ
L
)0 + (1− µ
L
)1 + ...+ (1− µ
L
)T−1
)
= (1− µ
L
)T (LD(θ0)− L∗D) +
pσ2
2L
L
µ
(
1− (1− µ
L
)T
)
≤ (1− µ
L
)T (LD(θ0)− L∗D) +
pσ2
2µ
.
Taking T = O˜
(
log( n
22
pG2 ln(1/δ) )
)
, we have:
E [LD(θT )]− L∗D ≤ O
(
pG2 ln(1/δ) log(n)
n22
)
.
A.2 The Lipschitz Constant of Logistic Regression when Using Cross-Entropy
When using cross-entropy, the loss function of logistic regression is:
J(θ) = − 1
n
n∑
i=1
[yi log(h(zi)) + (1− yi) log(1− h(zi))] , (17)
where h(zi) = 11+e−zi and zi = xiθ.
Proof. From (17), we have:
` = y log(h(z)) + (1− y) log(1− h(z)).
Then, note that∇h(z) = h(z)(1− h(z)), we have:
∇` = y 1
h(z)
∇h(θ) + (1− y) −1
1− h(z)∇h(θ)
= xy
1
h(z)
h(z)(1− h(z)) + x(y − 1) 1
1− h(z)h(z)(1− h(z))
= x(y − h(z)).
Note that 0 < h(z) < 1, ‖y‖ ≤ 1 and x is normalized, we have ‖∇`‖ ≤ 1, which means the Lipschitz constant of ` is 1.
B. More Experimental Results
We give the accuracy and optimal gap (defined as L(θ) − L(θ∗), θ∗ is centralized optimal non-privacy model) over privacy
budget  from figure 3 to figure 11. Figure 3, 5, 7, 9 and 11 show that by considering different weights held by clients, the
optimal gap of our method is better than the distributed method proposed in (Jayaraman et al. 2018) and is similar to the
centralized method proposed in (Wang, Ye, and Xu 2017), which means the excess empirical risk of our method is similar to
centralized methods. With the increasing of , the optimal gap decreases, which is the same as intuition. Figure 4, 6, 8 and 10
show that the accuracy of our method is better than the method proposed by Jayaraman et al. (2018) by considering weights of
parties. Experimental results show that the performance of our method is straight up to centralized methods, which is similar to
the theoretical analysis in Section 5.
Figure 12 to figure 16 show the accuracy and optimal gap over the level of non-average u. In this setting, the valuem and  are
chosen randomly. Figure 12, 14 and 16 show that with the increasing of u, which means data scale on different clients is more
and more uneven, the optimal gap of our method is steady. However, the optimal gap of the method proposed by Jayaraman
et al. (2018) increases rapidly or fluctuates sharply. Figure 13 and 15 show that the accuracy of our method is steady with the
increasing of u, while the accuracy of the method proposed in (Jayaraman et al. 2018) decreases rapidly or fluctuates sharply.
Thus, our method is more reliable than the method proposed by Jayaraman et al. (2018), especially in the case that data scale is
uneven, similar to the theoretical analysis in Section 5.
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Figure 3: Optimal gap on data sets over privacy budget . m = 32, data instances owned by each client is not the same.
(a) KDDCup99 (b) Adult (c) Bank
(d) Breast Cancer (e) Credit Card Fraud
Figure 4: Accuracy on data sets over privacy budget . m = 2, data instances owned by each client is not the same.
(a) KDDCup99 (b) Adult (c) Bank
(d) Breast Cancer (e) Credit Card Fraud
Figure 5: Optimal gap on data sets over privacy budget . m = 2, data instances owned by each client is not the same.
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Figure 6: Accuracy on data sets over privacy budget . m = 4, data instances owned by each client is not the same.
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Figure 7: Optimal gap on data sets over privacy budget . m = 4, data instances owned by each client is not the same.
(a) KDDCup99 (b) Adult (c) Bank
(d) Breast Cancer (e) Credit Card Fraud
Figure 8: Accuracy on data sets over privacy budget . m = 8, data instances owned by each client is not the same.
(a) KDDCup99 (b) Adult (c) Bank
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Figure 9: Optimal gap on data sets over privacy budget . m = 8, data instances owned by each client is not the same.
(a) KDDCup99 (b) Adult (c) Bank
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Figure 10: Accuracy on data sets over privacy budget . m = 16, data instances owned by each client is not the same.
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Figure 11: Optimal gap on data sets over privacy budget . m = 16, data instances owned by each client is not the same.
(a) KDDCup99 (b) Adult (c) Bank
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Figure 12: Optimal gap on data sets over the level of non-average u, with m = 16,  = 0.05.
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Figure 13: Accuracy on data sets over the level of non-average u, with m = 32,  = 0.1.
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Figure 14: Optimal gap on data sets over the level of non-average u, with m = 32,  = 0.1.
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Figure 15: Accuracy on data sets over the level of non-average u, with m = 8,  = 0.01.
(a) KDDCup99 (b) Adult (c) Bank
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Figure 16: Optimal gap over the level of non-average u, with m = 8,  = 0.01.
